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BORDERLINE ANXIETIES: WHAT WHITENING THE IRISH HAS 
TO DO WITH KEEPING OUT ASYLUM SEEKERS 
 
 ‘When you reach the broken promised land 
 And every dream slips through your hands 
 Then you’ll know that it’s too late to change your mind 
 ’Cause you’ve paid the price to come so far 
 Just to wind up where you are 
 And you’re still just across the borderline’ 
   (Ry Cooder/John Hiatt/James Dickinson ‘Across the Borderline’)1
 
 
Asylum Seekers and Zimbabwean Farmers 
It has become practically a cliché that Australia has the most penalising 
regulations for those now described as ‘asylum seekers’ of any first or second world 
country.2
The option of mandatory detention is not new, it comes from an interpretation of 
the Migration Act 1958 which, the same Fact Sheet explains right at the beginning, 
‘requires that all non-Australians who are unlawfully in mainland Australia must be 
  The Department of Immigration’s Fact Sheet on ‘Border Control’ tells us in 
stern rhetoric that: ‘The Australian Government is firmly committed to ensuring the 
integrity of Australia’s borders and to the effective control and management of the 
movement of people to and from Australia’.  The origins of the present bipartisan policy 
of detention of asylum seekers go back to 1992.  Among the reasons given for the 
implementation of this policy, the Department of Immigration’s Fact Sheet on 
‘Immigration Detention’ tells us that it ensures ‘unauthorised arrivals do not enter the 
Australian community until their identity and status has been properly assessed and they 
have been granted a visa’.  Here we find clearly illustrated the Australian government, in 
its role as executive of the Australian state, concerned with regulating as tightly as 
possible all access to the Australian national community. 
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detained and that unless they are granted permission to remain in Australia, they must be 
removed as soon as practical’.  Don McMaster tells us with more detail that the Act, 
presuming that such people would come as stowaways, ‘made provision for illegal 
entrants to be detained until the return of the vessel upon which they arrived.’3
‘The boat people presented a new challenge.  The boats they had arrived 
on were mainly fishing trawlers, small wooden boats that were classified as a 
quarantine risk by the authorities and subsequently burnt. Legislation decreed that 
the boat people, as illegal entrants without authorised visas or entry permits, could 
be detained until their boat could be turned around.  With their boats destroyed, 
boat people could be detained indefinitely.’
  McMaster 
goes on to describe how this Act has been opportunistically interpreted in regard to boat 
people: 
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The 1958 Migration Act was passed ten years after the creation of the category of 
‘Australian citizen’ by the passing of the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948.  While, of 
course, entry into the Australian community does not make one a citizen, the Australian 
state has always been deeply preoccupied with who might have that entry and, 
necessarily, from 1948 this has been thought about in terms of the exclusion of non-
citizens.  The concern over access to the Australian community only increased when the 
formal definition of an Australian was distinguished from being British.  Consolidating 
and replacing previous legislation, the object of the Migration Act 1958, as lain out in 




What, then, was the context for the introduction of mandatory detention for 
asylum seekers by the Labor government in 1992?  For this, we need to go back to the 
FitzGerald Report of 1988, Immigration: A Commitment to Australia.  This report 
brought together the so-called immigration debate over peoples from which countries, and 
how many, should be allowed into Australia with concerns among certain, especially 
conservative, groups about the functioning of multiculturalism as a policy and anxiety 
over the commitment of migrants to Australia.  The report sought ways that the state 
could intervene and manage the relation between migration and multiculturalism so as to 




As I have remarked elsewhere, central to the FitzGerald Report was ‘the new idea, 
especially in Australia, that the state, to some extent, consciously manages the national 
culture’.6  This idea was fundamental to the government’s blueprint for the future of 
multiculturalism, published in 1989, called National Agenda for a Multicultural 
Australia.  From this point of view, the introduction of mandatory detention in 1992 was 
an extension of the state’s recognition of the connections between immigration, 
population management and national identity.  Mandatory detention secured the border so 
that nobody who did not have proper approval from the state could enter the national 
community.  Such thinking understands the national polity as requiring the strictest 
policing by the state.  So great is this concern that, in 2001, the government passed 
legislation actually excising parts of the Australian territory from what is known as the 
migration zone, Ashmore and Cartier reefs, Christmas and Cocos Islands, thus ensuring 
that asylum seekers landing at these places could not apply for visas to enter Australia.  
Instead they were funnelled into the so-called ‘Pacific Solution’.7
We can very briefly compare these practices with those of Britain, the colonial 
power and reference point for Australian understandings of whiteness.  There, the 
Immigration Act of 1971 gave the state the possibility of detention for aspiring migrants 
who, it was considered, might pose some, unspecified threat.  In Britain, the vast majority 
of asylum seekers are given ‘temporary admission’ pending a Home Office decision on 




Unlike Britain, in Australia, it would seem that asylum seekers, in attempting to 
breach the border of the state, are automatically perceived to pose a threat.  Recently, this 
has been most clearly illustrated in the so-called Tampa affair of 2001 where the 
government struggled to ensure that four hundred and thirty-three asylum seekers, picked 
up by the Norwegian container ship Tampa, were kept from being landed on Australian 
territory.  As Anthony Burke writes in In Fear of Secirity: ‘the Tampa affair was the 
culmination of a policy approach to refugees which had become increasingly securitised 
and repressive—indeed with the use of the SAS and the stationing of the Australian navy 
in the seas off Indonesia, it had become thoroughly militarised.’
  Campaigns in Britain tend to focus on the, relatively few, asylum seekers who are 
detained without explanation.   
9   
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Another example of the Australian preoccupation with the border is found in the 
different treatment meted out to those people who enter Australia lawfully before asking 
for asylum.  Peter Mares writes that: 
Those who enter lawfully (for example, on a tourist or student visa) are usually 
not detained and can live freely in the community.  Provided that they apply for 
refugee status within forty-five days of arrival, such ‘lawful’ asylum seekers can 
also obtain a work permit.’10
Here we can see well what a difference how one crosses the border makes.  As with these 
legal asylum seekers, so-called ‘overstayers,’ that is, people who enter Australia on 
properly issued visas and who then simply do not leave when their visas run out, are also 
treated differently from ‘illegal’ asylum seekers.  Senator Christabel Chamarette was on 
the Joint Standing Committee on Migration in 1994 when it was asked to inquire into 
immigration detention practices in Australia.  As McMaster writes, what was of major 
concern to Chamarette, in her dissenting report, ‘was the practice of detaining illegal 
arrivals but not detaining illegal overstayers, highlighting the discriminatory practice by 
which detention depended on mode of entry into Australia.’
 
11  It is also the case that, in 
both 1999 and 2000, over eighteen percent of each year’s overstayers came from the 
United Kingdom and the United States.12
In order to begin to understand what underlies this Australian anxiety over the 
crossing of the border I want to turn to an analogy which has much currency among those 
speaking in favour of the asylum seekers.  I most recently heard it used at a public 
seminar in Perth early in 2002 by Andrew Markus, the eminent commentator on race 
issues in Australia.  The analogy asks, if the asylum seekers who fill the leaky boats 
attempting to reach the Australian migration zone were white Zimbabwean farmers 
forced to leave Zimbabwe, would the Howard government—or, we might add a Labor 
government given that mandatory detention is a bipartisan policy—treat them in the same 
way that it is treating the Kurds, Iraqis, Afghans who, at present, make up the majority of 
  Citizens of these countries comprised the two 
largest groups of overstayers.  In June 2000 there were estimated to be 58,748 overstayers 
in Australia.  Given that the United Kingdom and the United States are still ideologically 
constructed as, in the main, white countries, most of that eighteen percent will be ‘white’ 
within the definition that Australia uses.  White people, as we will see, are also those for 
whom the Australian border is more likely to be permeable.     
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the asylum seekers.  The implicit expectation in this hypothetical question is that white 
Zimbabwean farmers would be treated differently. 
The source for this story, and the expectation, goes back to 2000 when, in the 
wake of attacks on white farmers by self-styled veterans of the 1970s Zimbabwean 
liberation war, both John Howard, in his capacity as Prime Minister, and Philip Ruddock 
as Minister for Immigration, spoke of the possibility of offering white Zimbabwean 
farmers some kind of refuge in Australia.13
‘The British attitudes to racial questions before World War II were based 
in part on the imperial experience, but mainly on ignorance.  Thus, colored 
people lacked any specific identity and were all simply characterized as 
“natives”’.
  The implication here is that white asylum 
seekers would be treated differently from coloured asylum seekers.  I use the word 
‘coloured’ here deliberately because it is a term from Australia’s past, from the long 
period before the policy of multiculturalism.  In Elazar Barkan’s book entitled The 
Retreat of Scientific Racism, he writes that:  
14
Australia inherited the term ‘coloured’ from Britain, and used it similarly.   
 
We are, though, not just talking about any white people.  Like Australia, Rhodesia 
was a settler colony.  Also like Australia, the land of the indigenous people was 
expropriated for the use of white settlers.  More, in both cases the land was settled as 
colonies under British auspices.  From an Australian perspective the ‘whiteness’ of these 
white Zimbabwean farmers derives from their sharing a common stock with those who 
still occupy the site of the Australian national myth, the white English who, so the story 
goes, settled Australia.15  What we have here, then, is a (post)colonial saga.  An anxiety 
not about those entering the country but about the unsettling of one’s colonial presence 
within the country.  Underneath the concern for the white Zimbabwean farmers by the 
Australian government lurks another, more generalised, anxiety.  Could the indigenous 
people of Australia at some point have the power to begin a land redistribution?  Such an 
anxiety underlay much of the reaction through the 1990s to the Mabo decision handed 
down by the High Court in June, 1992, and what this might mean for Land Rights claims 
across Australia.16  In this instance the assumption of a common whiteness is based on a 
claim to a common colonial heritage. 
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In these two examples, asylum seekers and white Zimbabwean farmers, we find a 
common concern—who should not be allowed into Australia, and who should.  For 
whom should the border be impenetrable, solid, and for whom should it, at best, appear to 
not exist.  In a spirit of even-handed morality, the Sydney Morning Herald’s editorial for 
26 April 2000, comments: 
‘It is not that [the Australian government] should not respond generously, 
as Australia has over the years to various humanitarian crises.  But it also 
needs to be aware that any appearance of especially favoured treatment for 
people from Zimbabwe because they are white, English-speaking and 
predominantly Anglo-Saxon would smack of double standards—all the 
more so in view of the Government’s hard-nosed approach to boat people 
and its insistence on repatriating Kosovars and East Timorese to their 
ravaged countries when their temporary “safe haven” terms expired.’17
The editorial’s position is that there should be one rule for everybody.  At the same time, 
it suggests that these white farmers could likely be accommodated by way of refugee 
status, family or special skills categories.  In other words, the system as it stands could be 
made to work to their advantage, unlike other groups such as boat people or the Timorese. 
 
Even in its criticism of the position adumbrated by the Australian government, 
this editorial delineates for us the whiteness which continues to underlie Australia’s 
border practices, a whiteness much more obvious in the moments when the formal system 
of immigration regulation is challenged from the outside, or potentially simply 
disregarded from within.  White Zimbabwean farmers are ‘white’, as we have seen, by 
virtue of their British, read Anglo-Saxon—another old term resurrected here—heritage 
and their shared positioning in the (post)colonial problematic.18  However, Kosovars, in 
spite of coming ambiguously from within the space of ‘Europe’ are not white—being 
Muslim or of any other non-Christian faith has always counted heavily against being 
considered ‘white’ in Australia;19
Borders; Keeping Coloured People Out 
 boat people, mostly Muslims from central and western 
Asia, so neither European nor Christian, are certainly not white; and East Timorese who, 
while being Christian are, to use the term Barkan identifies, a ‘native’ people 
Christianised by their Portuguese colonizers (and inducted into Roman Catholicism at 
that!), are also not white. 
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Borders are one of the key characteristics of the modern nation-state.  Anthony 
Giddens has offered this definition: ‘The nation-state, which exists in a complex of other 
nation-states, is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative 
monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned 
by law and direct control of internal and external violence’.20
‘In all cases, ‘frontier’ refers to an area on the peripheral regions of a state 
(not necessarily adjoining another state) in which the political authority of 
the centre is diffuse or thinly spread.  A ‘border’, on the other hand, is a 
known and geographically drawn line separating and joining two or more 
states’.
  A border marks the limit of 
a particular state’s region of control.  Giddens distinguishes between frontiers and 
borders. 
21
The border, as opposed to the frontier, is a defining characteristic of the modern state.  In 
such states with centralised power, the power at the border is as strong as at the centre.  
This power is most usually exercised to allow in, or keep out, goods, for example drugs, 
food, imports generally, and human beings.  Sometimes, rarely, a state patrols its border 
to keep goods or people, not necessarily members of the state, citizens, in.  The German 
Democratic Republic, East Germany, was an example of such a state. 
 
In nineteenth and twentieth century Europe, the legitimating myth was of a 
national entity, its origin lost in the mists of time, whose existence was guaranteed and 
protected by a state structure which grew up through it, positioning the nation on a 
particular territory.22
The border functions as a marker of decisive fracture producing ‘us’ and ‘them’, 
‘self’ and ‘Other’ and, in that process, legitimating the distinctions which are claimed to 
inhere in ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘self’ and ‘Other’.  It is, then, the radical, apparently onto-social 
  The purpose of patrolling the border of this state was to keep out 
those who might try to enter, or to ensure that those allowed in had legitimate business.  
In settler nation-states the situation was very different.  There was no pre-existing nation, 
the nation had to be produced, and its composition was an effect of decisions made by the 
state, in the form of the government.  Thus, since Federation in 1901, the Australian 
border has always been the site of state decisions about whom to allow in and whom to 
bar, and these decisions have always been closely related to debates over the formation of 
the national population. 
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break, foundational to the modern experience, which the modern world constituted as the 
border, a break which articulates the limits of power, which enables the production of 
people as members of diverse categories: asylum-seeker, refugee, migrant, tourist, citizen.  
The requirement of the border as onto-social break is that it should resolve ambiguity.  
However, at the limits of power where ‘outside’ is constituted and distinguished from 
‘inside’, the border proliferates ambiguity while making plain the working assumptions 
on which it operates as a discursive practice. 
In Local Histories/Global Designs, Walter Mignolo describes the guiding premise 
of his argument like this: 
‘Following the previous configurations of the field of knowledge in 
Western memory, I will use gnoseology as the discourse about gnosis and 
I will understand by gnosis knowledge in general, including doxa and 
episteme.  Border gnosis as knowledge from a subaltern, perspective is 
knowledge conceived from the exterior borders of the modern/colonial 
world system, and border gnoseology as a discourse about colonial 
knowledge is conceived at the conflictive intersection of the knowledge 
produced from the perspective of modern colonialisms (rhetoric, 
philosophy, science) and knowledge produced from the perspective of 
colonial modernities in Asia, Africa, and the Americas/Caribbean.’23
Mignolo is not much interested in the borders between states.  Rather his starting point is 
the historical production of the border that produced ‘Europe’ and its ‘Others’, the 
historical border which, in its geographical transposition signified the distinction between 
the modern world and its alter.  This world has its beginnings in the sixteenth century—
the benchmark date here is 1492, the year of the ‘discovery’/invention of the American 
New World and also the year of the expulsion of those uncomfortably ambiguously-
positioned strangers-who-came-and-stayed, the Jews, from Spain.
 
24  Mignolo, though, is 
not here interested in the production of colonial knowledges.  His concern is with an 
already colonised world, a world system in which the coloniser, let us say Europe and its 
settler outposts, polices a more fundamental border between itself and the colonial 
modernities beyond ‘itself,’ those, as Mignolo writes, of Asia, Africa and the 
Americas/Caribbean.25 
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At this point I may appear to have moved a long way from the problem of 
Australia, its construction of whiteness, and asylum seekers.  I have not.  Where Mignolo 
writes in rather abstract terms about a conflictive intersection of, we might way, inner and 
outer knowledges, we can identify the construction of a border in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, the purpose of which was to stop population flow from the sites of 
colonial modernities to Europe and its settler outposts.  The purpose of this paper is to 
describe the effects of the integration of the Australian border, the literal border of the 
new Australian state which was a consequence of Federation in 1901, into this more 
general border. 
One, crucially important, way of thinking about this other border is that it had, as 
its primary feature, a preoccupation with whiteness.  Charles Price has discussed the 
history of this border in an important but unfortunately now rather neglected book entitled 
The Great White Walls Are Built: Restrictive Immigration to North America and 
Australasia 1836-1888.26  Published in 1974, Price’s book focuses on relations between 
the incipient Anglo, ‘white’, settler states of the Pacific rim and the Chinese, and to some 
extent Japanese, who attempted for various reasons, to enter these colonies and states.  
Price notes the small amount of Chinese migration during the 1830s and 1840s, as he 
writes, ‘not enough to produce restrictions on immigration but enough to raise worries 
about a new kind of semi-slavery and about relationships between industrially advanced 
European peoples in the Pacific borderlands and immigrants from industrially backward 
and ‘inferior’ societies’.27
Then in the 1850s came the great waves of Cantonese gold-diggers, 
flooding into California, then Eastern Australia, then New Zealand and 
finally British Columbia: these waves did arouse strong fears and 
antipathies amongst the white colonists, leading to restrictions on entry 
and discriminatory measures to keep Chinese out of certain areas, 
occupations and civil liberties’.
  He goes on to write: 
28
This is not the place to discuss the restrictive immigrations Acts passed by the various 
Australian colonies in the second half of the nineteenth century.  Suffice it to say that 
there were many of them and that a number specifically identified the Chinese.  The 
Chinese were generally regarded as a grossly inferior race, often thought to be barely 
human at all.  The white Californian, Frank Pixley, stated to the 1876 Congressional 
Committee: ‘The Chinese are inferior to any race God ever made. . .I think there are none 
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so low. . .  I believe that the Chinese have no souls to save, and if they have, they are not 
worth the saving’.29  In Australia, the Shearer’s Record, 15th August 1888, carried a 
report that, ‘a congregation of Europeans numbering a thousand persons and embracing 
representatives of every class and creed, assembled on one of the Hobson Bay piers, and 
looking at the cargo of immigrants from the “Flowery Isles”, would regard their 
appearance on deck much in the same light as they would a similar detachment of a 
certain kind of animal which youngsters exhibit a partiality for in the Zoological 
Gardens’.30
While it was the Chinese who were often singled out because of the numbers 
which had begun arriving in the Pacific, white settler territories in latter half of the 
nineteenth century, the concern was spread more widely.  To focus on Australia, Myra 
Willard, in her account of the inception of the White Australia Policy, writes that: ‘The 
desire to guard themselves effectively against the dangers of Asiatic immigration was one 
of the most powerful influences which drew the Colonies together’.
 
31  She notes that 
before Federation, the Colonies had met three times at Intercolonial Conferences, 1880, 
1888, 1890, to discuss the issue of uniform legislation.  The anxiety in the Australian 
Colonies over ‘Asiatic’ immigration sat side by side with fears of invasion.  In his, more 
recent, discussion of the importance of this element in the move to federation, Burke 
notes, for example, that in Henry Parkes’ speeches ‘it became clear that he sought to 
found the new Australian political identity upon a symbiotic relation to an inferior, 
threatening and barbarous Other.’32
In the years up to and following Federation, as the idea of Australia as a unified 
nation administered by a single, federal, Australian state, was clarified and accepted so 
we find a shift of rhetoric from simply keeping out the undesirable Chinese to making a 
distinction between ‘white’ Australia and the ‘coloured races’ who should be excluded 
from this new nation.  Thus, in discussions of the 1901 Immigration Restriction Bill, 
Senators Sargood and Pearce could have an exchange specifically related to whether 
Pearce was urging this measure not ‘on the ground of the competition with the labour of 
these people, [the Chinese], but on the higher moral ground’.  Pearce replied to this query: 
‘On both grounds, the racial is the primary ground’.
    
33  Here, the Chinese were still being 
specifically singled out.  In addition, we should note here that race exclusion is identified 
as a moral good. 
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J.C. Watson, the leader of the Labor party saw the bigger picture.  He asserted 
that: 
‘the objection I have to the mixing of the coloured people with the white 
people of Australia—although I admit it is to a large extent tinged with the 
considerations of an industrial nature—lies in the main in the possibility 
and probability of racial contamination’.34
As ‘Australia’ began to be thought of as a nation, and a nation defined by its Anglo white 
origins in England, so the binary divide, inscribed at the border, became ‘white’ versus 
‘coloured’.  The Bulletin on 22nd June 1901, made the point with its usual bluntness, 
inveighing here against the British Secretary of State, Joseph Chamberlain: 
 
‘If Judas Chamberlain can find a black, or brown, or yellow race in Asia or 
Africa that has as high a standard of civilisation and intelligence as the 
whites, that is so progressive as the whites, as brave, as sturdy, as good 
nation building material and that can intermarry with the white without the 
mixed progeny showing signs of deterioration—that race is welcome in 
Australia regardless of colour’.35
By 1908, the nation-state of Australia having been in existence for seven years, the 
white/coloured binary had become naturalised.  T.A. Coghlan in a Times Special Article 




As is well-known, the Immigration Restriction Act 1901, passed in the first sitting 
of the new federal Australian parliament, did not identify any specific races to be 
excluded in the pursuit of white Australia.  This was in part due to pressure from Britain 
who, for trade reasons, did not want any particular groups, especially the Japanese, 
offended.
 
37  The Immigration Restriction Act was disguised as being concerned with 
education.  The potential migrant had to take a fifty word dictation test.  However, the 
draft of the notes to be sent to the Customs officers who were to administer the test 
included the sentence ‘All aboriginal inhabitants of Africa, Asia and Polynesia should be 
subjected to the test unless otherwise exempted.’38  Through the 1960s the administration 
of the Act was allowed to become increasingly lax as Australia began to move towards a 
non-racially discriminatory immigration policy.  Something formally achieved by the 
Whitlam Labor government in 1974.  Nevertheless, and this is my most important point 
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here, the continuing and current anxiety surrounding the administering of Australia’s 
immigration laws against ‘unlawful entrants’ are the effect of the Australian border doing 
double service, first to ‘protect’ the Australian nation and, second, as part of the Great 
White Wall protecting Europe and its outposts, including the United States, from 
population movements coming from those places that have been subject to the 
despoliation on which has been built European modernity with all its material wealth.  
In his book on the history of the Great White Wall in the twentieth century, The 
White Peril, Sean Brawley argues for its end in the late 1970s.  He writes: 
‘The influx of Indo-Chinese refugees in the 1970s and the relative ease 
with which they were admitted to North America and Australiasia was 
testament to how firmly committed these governments finally were to their 
immigration reforms.  These arrivals clearly indicated a major ideological 
shift in the white settler societies of the Pacific.  The White Peril was no 
more.  For the moment, anyway.’39
As should be clear, I think Brawley is mistaken.  The Great White Wall continues to 
exist, though in rather more subtle ways than previously.  At the least, it serves to control 
population movements from the impoverished postcolonial periphery to the still 
predominantly white, wealthy, (post)modern Euro-American heartland and its outposts.     
 
 
Inside the Border; Whitening the Irish 
So far I have discussed the production of the exterior of the doubled border, the 
border of the new Australian state which functioned also as a brick in the Great White 
Wall protecting Europe and its settler outposts from ‘coloured’ incursion.  Now I want to 
turn to the other side of that border, the inside that was the new Australian nation.  That 
the majority of the inhabitants of this new state were, we could say without exaggeration, 
obsessed with making it white, with forming a white nation, is a consequence of English 
settler colonialism but also an effect of what I have identified as the secondary function of 
the Australian border.  
From around the middle of the nineteenth century, as the idea of the nation 
became the taken-for-granted way of thinking about the diversity of population groups 
within the newly developing state system of Europe, so nations were often equated with 
races.  The consequence was that people sometimes spoke of white races rather than of a 
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single white race.  Thus, for example, T.A. Coghlan could not only pronounce an 
objection to the ‘coloured’ races being allowed into Australia, as quoted above, but could 
go on to write that: ‘In all Australian cities there are large communities of non-British 
Europeans who are greatly objected to on economic grounds, but whose presence is 
tolerated because they belong to the races with whom Australians may intermarry, and 
who may thus ultimately become absorbed in the general population’.40
However, there was one white race which, in England, and in the first half of the 
nineteenth century in Australia, was considered so very different, and so inferior, that it 
was often not thought of as white at all.  The Catholic Irish were considered to be so un-
white that, using marriageability as our scale here, John Beddoe, the English proto-social 
anthropologist, could write in The Races of Britain (1885) that, ‘Englishwomen very 
rarely marry Irish, or at least Catholic Irish, men’.
  It was the 
whiteness of these other European races that made them tolerable, and therefore 
marriageable. 
41  What we will find is that, as the 
notion of an Australian nation takes hold towards the end of the nineteenth century, so the 
Irish, previously racialised and, to all intents and purposes, excluded from whiteness both 
in England and Australia, become reconstituted within Australia as acceptably white, 
helping to produce a claimed homogeneous white nation.42  We must understand here 
that, as cultural differences were considered to be a consequence of racial differences, 
racial homogeneity was considered to be a prerequisite for the construction of the new, 
culturally homogeneous white nation.  Thus, for example, as A.T. Yarwood writes: 
‘Australian daily newspapers gave overwhelming support to the principle of absolutely 
excluding coloured immigrants, and accepted the aim of racial homogeneity as having 
primary importance’.43
From round about the latter part of the eighteenth century, in the context of 
Anglo-Irish colonialism, the task of constructing Irish difference shifted from the 
discourse of religion to that of race.  Irish racial difference was construed in terms of 
physiognomy rather than colour.
 
44  In Europe, through the eighteenth century, the study 
of facial features as the way to understand character was gradually raised to the status of a 
science.  In his discussion of physiognomy, L. Perry Curtis identifies Johann Kaspar 
Lavater (1741-1801), Pieter Camper (1722-1789), Johann Friedrich Blumenback (1752-
184), Sir Charles Bell (1774-1842) and James C. Prichard (1786-1848) as the key figures 
in this development.45  According to Curtis, from the time of the 1798 Irish uprising there 
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was a tendency to associate certain physical features with the Catholic Irish type.  Perhaps 
the most important of these was the prognathous (large and protruding) jaw which, Curtis 
tells us, ‘any student of Lavater would associate with brutal and vicious behaviour’.46
As the nineteenth century wore on, physiognomical beliefs, which had helped 
contribute to a ranking of races, became harnessed to evolutionary theory.  This was 
given a scientific form in Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species by Means of Natural 
Selection, published in 1859.  The consequence was that cartoons began to express what 
was a more general discursive understanding of the Irish as looking like ‘Negroes’ who 
were positioned near the bottom of the evolutionary tree of races and also, and 
increasingly, gorillas.  Curtis traces this latter development to the cartoonist for Punch, 
John Tenniel, who, in a reaction to Fenianism in the 1860s, started drawing simianized 
Irish.  The connection was widespread.  Curtis sums up these transformations: 
 
‘If educated Victorians—and by Victorians we do not mean just the 
English upper middle classes—had done no more than construct mutually 
derogatory comparisons between Irishmen and the Chinese, Hottentots, 
Maoris, Aborigines, Sudanese, and other “barbarians”, life might have 
been a shade less harsh for the vast majority of Irish Catholics.  But some 
Victorians on both sides of the Atlantic went further by discovering 
features in Irish character which they took to be completely simian or 
anthropoid.  In cartoons and caricatures as well as in prose, Paddy began to 
resemble increasingly the chimpanzee, the orangutan, and, finally, the 
gorilla’.47
In a letter to his wife, written in 1861, the English novelist and liberal reformer 
Charles Kingsley, travelling in Ireland a decade after the Great Famine, wrote:  
 
‘But I am haunted by the human chimpanzees I saw along that 100 miles 
of horrible country.  I don’t believe they are our fault.  I believe there are 
not only more of them than of old, but that they are happier, better, more 
comfortably fed and lodged under our rule than they ever were.  But to see 
white chimpanzees is dreadful; if they were black, one would not feel it so 
much, but their skins, except where tanned by exposure, are as white as 
ours’.48 
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Here, we can see how naturalised in England already, by the early 1860s, was the idea of 
the Catholic Irish as being human simians.  Tenniel was working within a rapidly 
established discourse.  In 1880 the Belgian political economist and essayist Gustave de 
Molinari commented that England’s largest newspapers ‘allow no occasion to escape 
them of treating the Irish as an inferior race—as a kind of white Negroes [sic]’.49  
Beddoe, who we have already met, argued that the Irish type typified by prognathism and 
associated features accounted for roughly twenty per cent of the Irish: ‘While Ireland is 
apparently [this type’s] present centre, most of its lineaments are such as lead us to think 
of Africa as its possible birthplace, and it may be well, provisionally, to call it 
Africanoid.’50
If in England the nineteenth century saw the Catholic Irish racialised as the very 
lowest possible race, and their whiteness acknowledged only as a kind of freak of nature, 
what happened to the Catholic Irish in the Australian Colonies?  In the nineteenth century 
those of Irish Catholic background made up a considerable proportion of the non-
Aboriginal population of the Colonies.  Chris McConville writes that Irish courts sent 
over 30,000 men and women to New South Wales and lesser numbers to the other convict 
colonies.  ‘Overall’, he tells us, ‘one in four convicts sent to the colonies was Irish’.
 
51  
Edmund Campion writes that, ‘by the time an accurate count was made, in 1828, 
Catholics numbered one-quarter of the colony’s population’.52
The English in the Australian Colonies brought their prejudices with them.  The 
notorious Samuel Marsden, who became known as ‘the Flogging Parson,’ arrived in New 
South Wales in 1793.  He rapidly became the chief Anglican clergyman.  In 1800 in a 
paper on the toleration of Catholicism in New South Wales, he wrote: ‘The number of 
Catholic Convicts is very great. . .and these in general composed of the lowest class of the 
Irish nation; who are the most wild, ignorant and savage Race that were ever favoured 
with the light of Civilisation’.
  Almost all of these will 
have been Irish.  Unlike the United States to which Irish migration peaked in the 
aftermath of the Great Famine, Australia attracted most free Irish migrants a decade later, 
during the Victorian gold rushes. 
53  In the Colonies the assumption that the Catholic Irish 
were a different, and inferior, race to the English was pervasive.  In his foundational book 
on The Irish in Australia, Patrick O’Farrell looks for empirical reasons for this.  He notes 
how foreign the Irish must have seemed with their different, albeit Christian, religion—
practicing Catholicism was not legally allowed until Catholic emancipation in 1829.  
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Then, large numbers of the Irish, convicts and migrants, spoke Gaelic and then there was 
‘often distinctive dress, clay pipes, odd hats, to say nothing of other characteristics, real or 
alleged; poverty, absence of skills, dirt’.54  However, we should understand that this 
image of foreignness only confirmed the racial difference, and inferiority, of the Irish in 
the perception of the Colonies’ Anglo population.  The Australian, 13th April 1846, 
offered this racial comparison in terms of work capacity: ‘We rate these three races as 
follows:—Three first rate lowland Scotch or English labourers or shepherds. . .to seven 
west and mountain Irish or highlanders, and to ten coolies. . .  We mean no offence in this 
to the Irish as a nation. . .’.55
Indeed, so inferior was the Irish race considered to be that the standard racial 
comparison was with the Aborigines.  In British racial thinking, given a scientific basis 
with the advent of Social Darwinism in the 1860s, Australian Aborigines were considered 
as being about the most primitive of races.  David Pearson writes that:  
  In this grading the Irish race comes out closer to the 
Chinese race than to the English.  This gives some idea of the gulf that was assumed to 
exist between the English and Irish. 
‘The British state had always believed that acknowledgment of 
sovereignty in the far corners of its Empire depended on notions of 
agriculture, property ownership (preferably private) and architecture as 
measures of civilisation.  Land had to be used and altered in order for its 
occupants to be accorded political recognition.  Few, if any, of the 
aboriginal peoples in North America met these criteria in full, hence the 
need for tutelage, but in Australia the indigenes and their life-style were 
often viewed as irremediably primitive’.56
The general acceptance of the extreme racial inferiority of Aborigines is illustrated by 
Emile Durkheim’s use of Aboriginal material in his classic sociological text, The 
Elementary Forms of Religious Life, first published in 1912.  This work claims to study 
‘the most primitive and simple religion which is actually known’.
 
57  In the same year 
Sigmund Freud wrote in Totem and Taboo, referring to the accepted anthropological 
view, that he will be using as his point of comparison with neurotics, ‘the tribes which 
have been described as the most backward and miserable of savages, the aborigines of 
Australia.’58   
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As Richard Broome points out, the setting of this understanding of Aborigines as 
one of, if not the, most inferior, most primitive race within a Social Darwinist framework, 
also justified the claim that Aborigines were dying out.  Broome quotes the Age from 
January 1888: ‘It seems a law of nature that where two races whose stages of progression 
differ greatly are brought into contact, the inferior race is doomed to wither and 
disappear’.59  In 1901, Broome writes, ‘Vincent Lesina told the Queensland parliament … 
‘that the law of evolution says that the nigger shall disappear in the onward progress of 
the white man.  There is really no hope at all.’’60
In 1843, O’Farrell writes, ‘Dr Alexander Thompson claimed that the Irish were 
intellectually inferior to Aborigines, “utterly useless”’.
  The use of generalising terms for the 
indigenous people of Australia such as ‘niggers,’ or, for that matter, ‘a/Aborigines,’ is an 
example of Barkan’s point that English simply characterised all non-white peoples 
similarly.    
61  In the 1870s a Mrs Baxter, an 
English traveller, ‘deemed native huts a distinct improvement on those she had seen in 
Ireland’.62  We have already noted that, with advent of scientific racism, the Irish were 
claimed to be derived from ‘Africanoid’ stock.  The same was commonly thought of 
Aborigines.  T. H. Huxley, for one, asserted in 1870 that the Tasmanian indigenes were 
Negritos, ‘men with dark skins and woolly hair who constitute a special modification of 
the Negro type.’63  The Tasmanians, though, were sometimes thought to be a distinct 
race, displaced on the mainland by more recent arrivals.  Edward Curt, author of the four 
volume The Australian Race, published in 1886, thought that ‘the Australian is, by 
descent, a Negro, crossed by some other race.’64   O’Farrell elaborates on the perceived 
similarities that the English in the Australian Colonies found between the Irish and the 
Aborigines, both were understood as, ‘primitive, backward, outmoded, the butt of 
impatience and contempt’.65
There were certain actual similarities in the colonial situations of Aborigines and 
Irish, and in the ways they were racialised, similarities which could lead to a certain 
empathy.  O’Farrell refers to the memories of Aboriginal activist Faith Bandler who 
recalls that in northern New South Wales: ‘In contrast to Protestant paternalist or 
exploitative whites, Irish Catholics treated the Aborigines as human beings, as equals, an 
equality extending to marriage’.
  Both were, as O’Farrell notes, pre-modern.   
66  Bob Reece makes a similar argument for empathy 
between two colonised peoples while commenting on the large number of Aboriginal 
activists with Irish family names.67  While such empathy may be part of the answer, the 
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most important context was the similar racial inferiority ascribed to both groups which, as 
a consequence, threw them together at the bottom of the social order in the Australian 
Colonies during the nineteenth century.  Indeed, not just racial inferiority, in the guise of 
the Irish as the Celtic race Murray Pittock notes that Celts were also thought of as a race 
in decline.68
The white British-Australian view of the Catholic Irish as a grossly inferior race 
was the dominant understanding of the Irish in the Australian Colonies until around the 
beginning of the 1880s.  At this time things began to change.  O’Farrell writes that: 
 
‘A.M. Topp’s series of articles in the Melbourne Review of 1881 mark a 
convenient point to mark the end of the phase of virtually unhindered 
denigration, though its themes, of course, continue—essentially that the 
Catholic Irish were of vastly inferior stock, that they had all the vices of 
their servile position (moral and intellectual deficiencies of all kinds), and 
that they needed strong English government for their own good’.69
O’Farrell’s point is that, from around this period, Irish-Australians begin to appear in 
print rebutting such slurs by demonstrating how successful the Irish had been in Australia.  
However, this is only a small part of the answer as to why such negative racial 
constructions started to die out. 
 
The most important reason lies in the beginnings of the movement to transform 
the various Colonies into a single state of Australia.  We have already seen that this move 
was, to a significant extent, driven by a concern to put in place a unified protection 
against the incursions of Chinese, and ‘Asiatics’ generally; that in producing a single 
border there was also a preoccupation with the establishment of a racially homogeneous, 
white population within this new Australian state.  To take another example of this, 
Willard quotes Alfred Deakin, at this time Attorney-General in the first federal 
government, reminiscing: 
‘No motive power operated more universally on this Continent, or in the 
beautiful island of Tasmania, and certainly no motive power operated 
more powerfully in dissolving the technical and arbitrary political 
divisions which previously separated us than the desire that we should be 
one people, and remain one people without the admixture of other races’.70 
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Obviously Deakin is here disregarding the indigenous population, as well as all those 
other groups considered coloured. 
What about the Catholic Irish, then, this large racialised minority, around a quarter 
of the population before the gold rush migration of the 1860s and 1870s?  Deakin is 
constructing a history in which the Irish were always white, always a part of a single 
people.  From around the 1880s the imperative to create a national, white population 
overtakes other racial attitudes.  Where the ‘whiteness’ of the Irish had been subsumed 
under a preoccupation with their physiognomy which, like their religion, so well 
demonstrated this racial inferiority, now the concern with racial homogeneity within the 
new Australian state shifted the emphasis from the physiognomy of the Irish to their 
‘whiteness’.  At the same time, Catholicism shifted from being an unacceptable heresy to 
being a lesser version of Christianity than that of the Church of England and Protestant 
sects but nevertheless acceptable.  The white, Anglo population transformed the Catholic 
Irish into a part of the white race(s) and assimilated them.  At the same time, the 
dominant racial rhetoric for the new nation shifted from its being composed of the 
‘British race’ to a claim about its whiteness per se.  While, as John Docker suggests,71
As we have seen, the ideological need to claim the new Australian nation as 
having a homogeneous ‘white’ population was overwhelming because, from the start, the 
border of the Australian state, initiated at Federation, served a double purpose, to define 
that state, and the white, modern nation within it, and to function as a part of a larger wall 
keeping out unwanted ‘coloured’ peoples, the colonised of Asia and of Africa and the 
Americas/Caribbean from Europe and its outposts.  Hence the whitening of the Catholic 
Irish—and, we can add, the convenient ‘forgetting’ of the much smaller populations of 
Afghans
 
Anglo-conformity was not pervasive until after World War I, by the end of the nineteenth 
century the Irish were moving from speaking Gaelic to English and many of the other 
signifiers of their ‘foreignness’, though not their religion, were being lost.  As a 
consequence the Irish were well-placed to be assimilated when the need arose. 
72, Indians73, people of African descent74 and other non-white groups—went 
along with a shift in discourse from ‘British’ to ‘white’ and from talking about specific 
groups to be kept out, most importantly the Chinese, who had been the largest non-white 
group after the Catholic Irish in the Colonies, to the generalising ‘coloured’ people.  The 
border was central in this new binary, as it still is. 
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Boat People Rhetoric and the Border 
While the rhetorical construction ‘asylum seekers’ is current right along the Great 
White Wall, and I am now including here the borders of the European Union, the term 
‘boat people’ has a particular resonance in Australia.  McMaster tells us that: ‘Boat 
people are predominantly South-East Asian asylum seekers who come to Australia by sea 
without authority’.75  While this works as a thumb-nail empirical definition, it is only half 
the story.  The idea of boat people travelling to Australia utilises the fact that most of 
Australia is a single island to materialise the abstract concept of the Australian border as 
an overdetermined site the purpose of which is to keep people out.  As a physical site, the 
border is thought of as extremely difficult to penetrate, requiring, at the least, boats.  
Thus, the connotation of boat people is one of threat, of invasion.  It is not surprising that 
the fear of invasion, usually by some ‘Asiatic’ race, has a history in Australia dating to 
around Federation.76
It is the relationship of ‘boat people’ to the idea of the Australian border as 
impermeable which has given rise to the left-liberal attempt to undermine this 
demonisation of ‘unlawful entrants’ in the phrase ‘We are all boat people’.  This phrase 
seeks to recognise that the white invaders/settlers of this land also came by boat.  
However, similar to the white Zimbabwean farmers narrative, this one also betrays a 
colonial anxiety.  In his discussion of boat people, Brett Nielson refers to a suggestion 
made by Christabel Chamarette at a symposium on boat people in 1995 that: ‘the 
aggression directed towards “boat people” in Australia perhaps reflects the fact that the 
country is a nation of “boat people”—i.e. the initial “white” settlers, who “stole” the land 
from its inhabitants and left behind a trail of genocidal carnage’.
  This invasion fear sits comfortably with the recognition that boat 
people are ‘coloured’, predominantly South-East Asian, in McMaster’s words, though his 
definition is now out of date.  Now we should say ‘western and central Asian,’ a term that 
preserves the linguistic identifer ‘Asian’ that has always sourced Australia’s fears of 
being over-run, whether through immigration or invasion—indeed, in the Australian 
imaginary as the Tampa crisis so well demonstrates these two are fundamentally blurred.   
77
We must, though, not forget the double service of the Australian border.  As a part 
of the Great White Wall it stands as an aspect of modernity.  The Wall, and the racialised 
division it expresses, continues, in this era of globalisation, to mark an economic division 
  More fundamentally, 
the phrase puts the very status of the indigenous inhabitants in question by 
acknowledging that they, too, arrived by boat. 
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expressed both in capital wealth and in global flows of goods, finance and, now, in 
people.78
In practical and local terms, the Australian anxiety about protecting the border of 
Australia is actually an anxiety about preserving the claim to the legitimacy of the border 
as an onto-social break, a binarising site which, in Australia, in spite of the present 
officially non-racially discriminatory immigration policy, continues to produce ‘coloured’ 
people outside trying to get in and the predominantly ‘white’ people inside who still make 
up what, in its imaginary, is the white Australian nation.  In The Gauche Intruder, 
Jennifer Rutherford utilises a Lacanian analysis to think through what she calls ‘the 
Australian Good’ and, she goes on, ‘to bring into focus its incumbent aggression.’
  Increasing numbers of people, those constructed as ‘coloured’, from those 
countries historically exploited by the modern, European order, are now following the 
flows of wealth and attempting to breach the Great White Wall.  The ethical problem 
posed here is not so much how to give access to the territory of the ‘West’ to more 
people, and how to dispense with the racialised distinction between ‘white’ and ‘non-
white,’ but how to equalise the global flows to give people across the world greater access 
to the wealth that has flowed out of those countries outside of the Wall and into what we 
can think of as the territories of the Euro-American (post)modern order. 
79  As 
she writes, she has ‘tried to seize hold of the repetition of a fantasy space in which the 
white Australian community organises its enjoyment.’80
In his important discussion of detention, Ghassan Hage has argued that the ‘Port 
Headland [detention facility] works as a psychoanalytic symptom: What are these 
pictures of ethnic caging being offered to us but images of ourselves as domesticated 
Third World-looking ethnics that constitute the very support for the reproduction of the 
White national fantasy of a multicultural Australia?’
  Rutherford recognises the 
connection between whiteness and a moral claim to ‘the Good’ in Australia.  I have 
already noted, commenting on the interchange between Senators Sargood and Pearce over 
the Immigration Restriction Bill 1901, that race exclusion was viewed as a moral good.  
As Rutherford indicates, this understanding has not dissipated.  The border functions as a 
moral site, distinguishing not only white from coloured but protecting the white 
Australian Good from racial pollution.   
81  Hage’s discussion is poised on a 
critique of the acceptability of the idea of toleration; that toleration functions on the terms 
of the powerful which, in Australia, continues to mean the so-called Anglo-Celtic, white, 
dominant.  We should note here that, while the post-1980s usage of ‘Anglo-Celtic’ 
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signals the hegemonic core in Australian multiculturalism, it also acknowledges the 
perpetuation of a differentiation between Anglos and Irish-background people, a 
suggestion that the Irish are still, perhaps, not-quite-totally white. 
Discussing Canada in A Border Within, Ian Angus writes that: ‘The core of the 
argument is that respect for the Other can only be established through an ethical practice 
that maintains a border which refuses to cannabalize the other by the self’.82
The modern border strives for an absoluteness of interior and exterior categories.  
As we have seen, the most fundamental of these in Australia’s case, as a settler outpost of 
the modern, white world, has been ‘white’ and ‘coloured’.  The more there is an attempt 
to establish such clear categories, the more the border becomes mired in ambiguity.  What 
exactly are the limits of whiteness; how should coloured be defined?  We might begin to 
rethink the possibilities of the border by coupling Angus’ idea of ethical practice of the 
border with Scott Michaelsen and David Johnson’s profoundly postmodern retheorisation 
of borders from the point of view of an unsettled identity, ‘comprehending the cultural 
and linguistic self as necessarily incomplete, coming to be, held open to “outside” 
cultures, while at the same time, as having always already enfolded the other within itself, 
with the border between the inside and outside, in principle, uncloseable’.
  I understand 
this to mean the maintenance of a border which preserves the integrity of the Other and 
does not try to exclude it because of its Otherness, or attempt to include it, make it a part 
of the nation-state, by a process of destruction and reconstruction.  This is how the 
cultural pluralist understanding of multiculturalism works in Australia, as a weak form of 
assimilation.  Hage’s point is that detention acts out this process of making the coloured 
Other safe.  Needless to say, this is not a practice which respects the integrity of the 
Other—the Other which, as we have seen, in a general sense has been produced as Other 
through the very existence of the border as a characteristic feature of modernity.    
83
 
  Rethinking 
the possible practice of the Australian border in this way would, at the very least, offer an 
ethical template for understanding how the border at present works to confine the horizon 
of possibilities for life on both the inside and the outside of Australia and, indeed, for the 




Anderson, Benedict. 1991 Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism, Verso, London. 
 
Anderson, Warick. 2002 The Cultivation of Whiteness: Science, Health and Racial 
Destiny in Australia, Melbourne UP, Carlton. 
 
Angus, Ian. 1997 A Border Within: National Identity, Cultural Plurality, and Wilderness, 
McGill-Queen’s UP, Montreal. 
 
Anzaldua, Gloria. 1987 Borderlands/La Frontera, Aunt Lute Books, San Francisco.  
 
Barkan, Elazar. 1992 The Retreat of Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in 
Britain and the United States Between the World Wars, Cambridge UP, Cambridge. 
 
Bauman, Zygmunt. 1991 Modernity and Ambivalence, Polity, Cambridge. 
 
Beddoe, John. 1983 The Races of Britain (1885) Chapter XIII, Cliveden Press, 
Washington DC. Found at: 
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~dnp5c/Victorian/racebrit.html. 
 
Brawley, Sean. 1995 The White Peril: Foreign Relations and Asian Immigration to 
Australasia and North America 1919-1978, UNSW, Sydney. 
 
Burke, Anthony. 2001 In Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety, Pluto Press, 
Sydney. 
 
Calderon, Hector and Jose David Saldivar. 1991 Criticism in the Borderlands: Studies in 
Chicano Literature, Culture and Ideology, Duke University Press, Durham NC. 
 
Campion, Edward 1982 Rockchoppers: Growing Up Catholic in Australia, Penguin, 
Ringwood. 
 
Curtis, L Perry. 1997 Apes and Angels: The Irishman in Victorian Caricature, 
Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington DC. 
 
 24 
Duffield, Ian. 1985 Martin Beck and Afro-Blacks in Colonial Australia, Journal of 
Australian Studies.  
 
Dixson, Miriam. 1999 The Imaginary Australian: Anglo-Celts and Identity, UNSW Press, 
Sydney. 
 
Docker, John. 1994 Post-Nationalism, Arena Magazine, Feb-March, 41. 
 
Freud, Sigmund. 1940 Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement Between the Mental 
Lives of Savages and Neurotics. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, trans and ed James Strachey volume xiii. 
 
Geary, Patrick. 2002 The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe, Princeton 
UP, Princeton. 
 
Gellner, Ernest. 1983 Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell, Oxford. 
 
Giddens, Anthony. 1985 A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialim; vol 2,The 
Nation-State and Violence, University of California Press, Berkeley. 
 
Hage, Ghassan. 1998 White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural 
Society, Pluto Press, Sydney. 
 





Hughes, Robert. 1987 The Fatal Shore: A History of the Transportation of Convicts to 
Australia 1787-1868, Pan Books, London, 188. 
 
Innes, C.L. Postcolonial Studies and Ireland. In Ashok Bery and Patricia Murray (eds) 
Comparing Postcolonial Literatures: Dislocations, MacMillan, Basingstoke. 
 
Johnson, David and Scott Michaelsen (eds) 1997 Border Secrets: An Introduction in 
Border Theory: The Limits of Cultural Politics, Minneapolis UP, Minneapolis.  
 
 25 
Kerney, Michael. 1998 Transnationalism in California and Mexico at the End of Empire. 
In Thomas Wilson and Hastings Donnan (eds), Border Identities: Nation and State at 
International Frontiers, Cambridge UP, New York. 
 
Mares, Peter. 2001 Borderline: Australia’s Treatment of Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 
UNSW Press, Sydney. 
 
Markus, Andrew. 2001 Race: John Howard and the Remaking of Australia, Allen & 
Unwin, St. Leonards. 
 
Markus, Andrew. 1994 Australian Race Relations, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards.  
 
McConville, Chris. 1987 Croppies, Celts and Catholics: The Irish in Australia, Edward 
Arnold, Caulfield East Victoria. 
 
McMaster, Don. 2001 Asylum Seekers: Australia’s Response to Refugees, Melbourne UP, 
Melbourne. 
 
Mignolo, Walter. 2000 Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern 
Knowledges and Border Thinking, Princeton UP, Princeton.  
 
Migration Act 1958.  
Found at:http://ww.Austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ma1958118/s4.html. 
 
Nielson, Brett. 1996 Threshold Procedures: Boat People in South Florida and Western 
Australia, The Critical Arts 10(2).  
 
‘Out of Africa, An Exodus,’ 2000 Sydney Morning Herald, 26 April. 
 
O’Farrell, Patrick. 1987 The Irish in Australia, NSW UP, Kensington. 
 
Pearson, David. 2001 The Politics of Ethnicity in Settler Societies: States of Unease, 
Palgrave, Basingstoke. 
 
Pittock, Murray. 1999 Celtic Identity and the British Image, Manchester UP, Manchester. 
 
 26 
Price, Charles. 1974 The Great White Walls are Built: Restrictive Immigration to North 
America and Australasia 1836-1888, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 
Canberra. 
 
Protecting the Border: Immigration Compliance, Chapter 7, 2000. Found at: http://www. 
Immi.gov.au/illegals/border2000/index.htm.  
 
Reece, Bob. 2000 The Irish and the Aborigines. In Tadhg Foley and Fiona Bateman (eds) 
Irish-Australian Studies: Papers Delivered at the Ninth Irish-Australian Conference, 
Galway, April 1997, Sydney, 192-204.  
 
Rutherford, Jennifer. 2000 The Gauche Intruder: Freud, Lacan and the White Australian 
Fantasy, Melbourne UP, Carlton. 
 
Stevens, Christine. 1989 Tin Mosques and Ghantowns: A History of Afghan Camel 
Drivers in Australia, Oxford UP, Melbourne.  
 
Stratton, Jon. 1998 Race Daze: Australia in Identity Crisis, Pluto Press, Sydney. 
 
Stratton, Jon. 2000 Not Just Another Multicultural Story: English Migrants and the 
Ideology of ‘Fitting In’ to Australia Journal of Australian Studies, 66, 23-47. 
 
Tascon, Sonia Magdalena. 2002 Refugees and Asylum-seekers in Australia: Border-
crossers of the Postcolonial Imaginary. In on-line journal Mots Pluriels: Revue 
internationale en ligne de Letters et de Sciences humaines: Found at: 
http://www.arts.uwa.edu.au/MotsPluriels/. 
 
Third, Amanda. Does the Rug Match the Carpet?: Race, Gender and Red-Headedness, 
unpublished. 
 
Wade, Robert. 2001 Winner and Losers, The Economist, April 26.  Found at: 
http://www2.gol.com/users/coynerhm/winners and losers of rich and poor. htm.  
 
Willard, Myra, 1967 History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, Cass, London. 
 
 27 
Yarwood, A.T. 1964 Asian Immigration to Australia: The Background to Exclusion 1896-
1923, Melbourne UP, Melbourne. 
 
                                                 
1  These lyrics refer to the border between the United States and Mexico and, in 
particular, to those people attempting to enter the United States from Mexico.  
There is now a deal of writing about this border, and inspired by this border.  A 
good place to start is Gloria Anzaldua Borderlands/La frontera San Francisco 
1987, see also Michael Kerney ‘Transnationalism in California and Mexico at the 
End of Empire’ in Thomas Wilson and Hastings Donnan eds. Border Identities: 
Nation and State at International Frontiers Cambridge, 1998, pp. 117-116, and 
Hector Calderon and Jose David Saldivar Criticism in the Borderlands: Studies in 
Chicano Literature, Culture, and Ideology Durham, N.C., 1991.  Unlike the 
border between the United States and Canada, that between the United States and 
Mexico is a part of what, later in this article, I shall refer to as the Great White 
Wall. 
2  My discussion of asylum seekers and the Australian border has benefited from 
conversations with Sonia Magdalena Tascόn.   The online journal Mots Pluriels: 
Revue internationale en ligne de Lettres et de Sciences humaines 
(http://www.arts.uwa.edu.au/MotsPluriels/) will be publishing an article by her 
entitled 'Refugees and Asylum-seekers in Australia: Border-crossers of the 
Postcolonial Imaginary' in issue No 21, May, 2002. 
3  Don McMaster Asylum Seekers: Australia’s Response to Refugees Melbourne, 
2001, p. 74. 
4  McMaster Asylum Seekers, p. 74. 
5  Found at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ma1958118/s4.html . 
6  Jon Stratton Race Daze: Australia in Identity Crisis Sydney, 1998, p. 112. 
7  Initiated in 2001, the so-called Pacific Solution involves the Australian 
government coming to agreements with various small Pacific countries such as 
Nauru for the placing of internment camps on their territory to hold asylum 
seekers.  These people can then be processed outside of Australian territory and 
will therefore not have available to them the rights which would accrue should 
they have reached Australian landfall—more specifically, should they have 
reached the Australian migration zone. 
8  McMaster offers a brief outline of British policy on asylum seekers in Asylum 
Seekers, pp. 99-102. 
9  Anthony Burke In Fear Of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety Sydney, 2001, 
p. 324.  Burke goes on to quote the Australian Prime Minister in 1913, as the first 
of Australia’s naval vessels arrived from British shipyards, saying that, ‘this fleet 
will defend White Australia from less advanced but aggressive nations all around 
us with lower standards.’  
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